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regionally’ (Kaplan 2000: 328). In other words, fragile 
states must be brought under benign US control or left 
to the mercy of fascist empires. Like Mackinder, Kaplan 
believes that, in the face of these challenges, idealism 
is not only ineffective, it is also dangerous: ‘[i]dealism 
shorn of any element of realism is immoral’ (Kaplan 
2003: xv).
e Materiality Of Ideology
!e return to Mackinder invokes a geographical 
approach to international relations that promises to 
naturalize a certain set of policy postures, placing them 
beyond challenge, the necessary response to a stable set 
of environmental causes (Kearns 2006). !is is not now, 
and was not in Mackinder’s day, the only geographical 
approach to foreign affairs and I want to outline four 
bases for an alternative, more progressive, Geopolitics 
(Kearns 2008). !e first is that force is not the only 
and irreducible basis of international relations. !e 
primacy of force lies behind Mackinder’s opposition 
of geographical realism to liberal idealism. !e confla-
tion of real with force is evident in ‘realist’ international 
relations theory with its dismissal of multilateral insti-
tutions as chimerical (Mearsheimer 1994). It is evident 
also in Kissinger’s (1994) preference for realpolitik over 
ideologically driven foreign policy. Yet ideas too have 
material expressions and effects. !e Cold War was 
many things but it is impossible to understand it without 
taking seriously the ideological differences between the 
USA and the USSR over the meaning and legacy of 
European modernity (Buck-Morss 2000; Westad 2005). 
International agreements to prosecute crimes against 
humanity produce new risks for tyrants and may reduce 
the sense of impunity with which vicious leaders grant 
themselves immunity from prosecution (Robertson 
2006). !e United Nations embodied a global covenant 
that accelerated decolonization by delegitimizing colo-
nial rule (Jackson 2000).
!ese arguments were made by many among 
Mackinder’s contemporaries (Kearns 2009). Norman 
Angell (1909) argued that the most powerful nations 
were no more prosperous than many that had virtually 
no effective defense. Indeed, economic interdependence 
meant that states had a material interest in averting 
war if they could build institutions and trust that 
would defer or mitigate conflict. James Bryce (1921) 
proposed that a combination of a sufficient number of 
nations might develop the moral force to develop fora of 
conciliation and arbitration that would prevent at least 
many otherwise likely wars. John Hobson argued for a 
League of Nations with the right and ability to ‘apply an 
economic boycott, or in the last resort an international 
force’ (Hobson 1915: 6). Peter Kropótkin and Élisée 
Reclus argued that cooperation was the social force out 
of which humankind developed its highest capacities 
at all scales, from kin to the global ecumene (Kearns 
2009).
!ese alternatives to conflict developed international 
expression. !ey did not eliminate military action but 
then neither did military action eliminate the aspiration 
for cooperation and renewed attempts to devise better 
institutions and practices. International relations are a 
mix of force and association, of conflict and collabo-
ration, and foreign policy should attend to ways of 
building and preserving peace. Insisting that only one 
side of this equation is real confounds attempts to rein-
force the other.
Geopolitical Economy
Kaplan and Mackinder explain the geography of 
conflict in terms of fundamental spatial realities that are 
relatively unchanging. Kaplan finds that in the regions 
where empires clash, political institutions are shattered 
loosing ethnic and sectarian hatreds. !ese are the very 
regions that Nicholas Spykman (1942) identified as 
the rimlands of Mackinder’s Heartland. However, the 
continuity of conflict in these places is due more to the 
instability produced by earlier conflicts than by stable 
geographical realities. For example, the British fought 
wars in Iraq during 1914-18, 1920-21, 1922-4, 1943, 
and 1945, and in Afghanistan during 1839-42, 1878-80, 
and 1919, and of course are in both places yet. Current 
patterns of disadvantage flow from this past rather arising 
afresh in the present by impress of the environment. !e 
relatively stable elements result from our having a hydro-
carbon economy and under these conditions the Great 
Powers have a continuing interest in the Caspian Basin 
and Iraq. In other words, the continuity of instability is 
produced by recurrent external interest rather than by 
geographically determined local conditions.
!e economic interests involved in imperialism 
were identified by Mackinder’s contemporaries, such as 
Composed at the end of the First World War, 
Halford Mackinder’s Democratic Ideals and Reality: A 
Study in the Politics of Reconstruction poured the cold-
water of geographical determinism over the liberal 
idealism of Woodrow Wilson’s proposed new world 
order. Mackinder suggested that while a disarmed world 
of global law and national self-determination remained 
a noble ideal, geographical realities made it dangerous 
folly to expect it any time soon. Instead, Mackinder 
warned that a world brimful of super-powers and their 
colonies would see various attempts at global hegemony, 
and that, should any one power bring under its sway 
the resource basket of oil, wheat, and coal to be found 
in West Russia, the Ukraine, and the Caspian Basin, it 
stood fair to dominate a unipolar world. Against this 
possibility, treaties and law were paper tigers, only a 
countervailing and superior military force could offer 
any real protection.
!is same dialectic of ideals and reality animates 
Robert Kaplan’s argument about the Revenge of 
Geography. Kaplan proposes that liberal humanists 
and neo-Conservatives are too ambitious, seeking to 
remake the world in line with their democratic aspira-
tions, but in doing so, they over-reach themselves and 
become mired in disasters like Vietnam or Iraq once the 
stubborn geographical realities of ethnic and regional 
distinctiveness assert themselves, leaving the United 
States in Iraq, for example, as ‘a land-based, in-your-face 
meddler […] caught up in sectarian conflict’ (Kaplan 
2009a). Atavistic conflicts flourish as the weak institu-
tions of states are shattered by globalization while the 
struggle for existence is sharpened by population growth 
amid dwindling resources. Writing of the Balkans, 
Kaplan finds recurrent conflict around primordial 
ethnic identities, as in Macedonia where, in the years 
preceding the First World War, ‘ethnic hatreds released 
by the decline of the Ottoman Empire had first exploded, 
forming the radials of twentieth-century European and 
Middle Eastern conflict, Macedonia was like the chaos 
at the beginning of time’ (Kaplan 1994: 51), and, again 
with the end of communism in Yugoslavia, Kaplan heard 
‘phantom voices that I knew were about to explode once 
again’ (Kaplan 1994: 5). As did Mackinder, Kaplan 
believes that he lives in dangerous times, ‘when politics 
are increasingly shaped by the physical environment. 
A brief moment marked by the Industrial Revolution, 
which gave humankind a chance to defend itself some-
what from nature, may be closing’ (Kaplan 1996: 4). 
As did Mackinder, Kaplan sees contemporary crises as 
replaying the intense territorial conflicts of an earlier 
closed-space world (Kearns 1984).
For Kaplan, geography divides the world into three 
sets of peoples: land powers, sea powers, and the regional 
ethnicities (‘granular ethnic and tribal elements’ (Kaplan 
2009b) scattered around them. Following Mackinder, 
Kaplan suggests that land-power is essential aggressive 
and dangerous, after all did not communism flourish 
around the edges of the great Russian land power and 
was not fascism a continental European phenomenon, 
whereas, ‘liberalism nurtured its deepest roots in the 
United States and Great Britain, essentially island 
nations and sea powers both,’ for ‘the sea, beyond the 
cosmopolitan influences it bestows by virtue of access 
to distant harbors, provides the inviolate border security 
that democracy needs to take root’ (Kaplan 2009c). !is 
places a particular burden upon the United States as, for 
example, ‘the only great power with no territorial designs 
on Asia [, allowing it …] to rise above realpolitik and act 
solely for the good of the region’ (Kaplan 2009d). Fragile 
states within the reach of aggressive and repressive land 
powers can be saved for liberal democracy although, ‘not 
[by] forc[ing] elections on societies ill prepared for them 
[,] but [by] project[ing] economic and military power 
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trenchant critique of the hypocrisy of British claims 
to elevated motives in its use of force came from John 
Hobson. Hobson’s study of the Psychology of Jingoism 
dissected much of the rhetoric sanitizing imperialism 
and in his famous study on Imperialism, he was refresh-
ingly direct:
Paramount power, effective autonomy, emis-
sary of civilisation, rectification of frontier, and 
a whole sliding scale of terms from ‘hinterland’ 
and ‘sphere of influence’ to ‘effective occupation’ 
and ‘annexation’ will serve as ready illustrations 
of a phraseology derived for purposes of conceal-
ment and encroachment. !e Imperialist who sees 
modern history through these masks never grasps 
the ‘brute’ facts, but always sees them at several 
removes, refracted, interpreted, and glozed by 
convenient renderings (Hobson 1988[1902]: 21).
Mackinder claims that geographical realities 
underpin international relations. In this manner, the 
issue of state agency and responsibility is hidden by 
environmental necessity. States, we are assured, have 
little choice but to play forcefully the hand that nature 
has dealt them. !is has three main consequences: it 
obscures the economic basis of much foreign policy, it 
denies the possibility of peaceful co-existence, and it 
excuses the violence of colonialism and imperialism. 
Some of Mackinder’s contemporaries understood this 
and if we are to revive geographical perspectives on 
international relations, then, we should return also to 
these anarchist and socialist alternatives.
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John Hobson (1901), and it is still true that jingoistic 
adventures are talked up by resource-hungry corpora-
tions. Another of Mackinder’s contemporaries, Élisée 
Reclus (1905, 1908) and Peter Kropótkin () argued 
that the free trade pressures from rich countries, led 
to the commodification of land in poor countries and 
the promotion there of an export-based, cash-crop rural 
economy to the serious detriment of indigenous food 
security. In this way, economic and thus political insta-
bility were intensified in ways that David Harvey (2003) 
today describes as accumulation by dispossession. !ese 
realities of geo-political economy do not feature in the 
environmental determinism of Kaplan and Mackinder. 
Yet these realities matter because under the guise of 
freedom or justice a whole series of economic relations 
were put in place by the USA and the USSR during the 
Cold War. Even now, freedom is invoked to justify the 
creation of free markets and the elimination of the very 
sorts of economic protection that almost every indus-
trialized country has relied upon when establishing 
companies that can compete with international enter-
prises (Bradshaw and Huang 1991; Lee 2008).
Primordial Ethnicities
A third difficulty with the geographical arguments of 
Mackinder and Kaplan is that they ground stable identi-
ties in regional ecologies. Kaplan proposes that when 
the artificial institutions of state and empire shatter, 
primordial ethnicities re-assert themselves. !is is what 
Lene Hansen (2006: 13) calls a ‘Balkan discourse,’ the 
suggestion that in certain places antagonistic identi-
ties persist and people with these identities will ever 
be at each other’s throats, whenever not restrained by 
the artificial institutions of state or empire. !ere are 
two problems with varieties of the ‘Balkan discourse.’ 
In the first place, ethno-national identities far from 
being a constant yearning have to be taught, diffused, 
and insisted upon. !e Serbian ethnicity that Kaplan 
attends to in Balkan Ghosts was staged and promoted 
over many years by Slobodan Milošević in order to create 
a Greater Serbian identity around which he could seize 
control of the destiny of the former Yugoslavia (Magas 
1993). He wanted control of the state because the tran-
sition from socialism created marvelous opportunities 
for those in power to profit from the sale of state assets 
(Holmstrom and Smith 2000). !e second problem 
with ‘Balkan discourses’ is that by placing the blame for 
ethnic antagonism in history, they divert attention from 
the scale and consequences of sectarian crimes in the 
present. Furthermore, they fail to attend to the role of 
justice in mitigating sectarian tensions and providing a 
basis for building due recognition and a parity of esteem 
between formerly hostile groups (!ompson 2002).
Again, similar arguments were made by several 
of Mackinder’s contemporaries. Peter Kropótkin’s 
(1969[1896]) discussion of the evolution of the state 
made clear the class-based dynamics of state formation 
and the invention by absolutist monarchs and, later, 
nationalist bourgeoisies of both ethnicity and tradition. 
Against the view that humanity is essentially competi-
tive and violent, many anarchists chose to stress instead 
the essential goodness of humanity and the natural-
istic basis for an ethics of cooperation and mutual aid 
(Kropótkin 1947[1922]). !is tradition is important 
because there is an accumulated expertise in conflict 
resolution (Cortright 2006; Kurlansky 2006) that is 
dismissed in Balkan discourse, producing a dispiriting 
and despairing view of Geopolitics.
National exceptionalism
!e final issue I wish to raise concerns the idea of 
national exceptionalism. Kaplan and Mackinder both 
insist that, although over much of the world the projec-
tion of force beyond national borders is aggressive and 
invasive, there is an exception. Both identify sea-power 
as essentially pacific and both view their own state as 
properly a sea-power. !e aggression of US foreign 
policy cannot so easily be treated as a sideshow. In the 
last twenty years the United States has used military 
force against twenty-four countries (Grossman 2009). 
!e current conflict in Iraq has produced some 100,000 
civilian casualties (Iraq Body Count 2009). In addition, 
the United States has engaged in covert activities in many 
more places, training and funding a variety of death 
squads (Grandin 2006) and now maintaining an archi-
pelago of sites of torture (Heiner 2007). Furthermore, it 
arms so many other countries that a large share of both 
civil and international conflict may properly be consid-
ered proxy wars (Loveman 2002).
Again, the national exceptionalism claimed by 
so-called sea-powers was challenged by Mackinder’s 
contemporaries. I have already noted Angell’s criticisms 
of Alfred Mahan (Navari 1989) but perhaps the most 
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Strategic vision is taken to be penetrative vision: it sees 
through the humdrum of daily events to the important 
structuring dualities of our time.  Second, the geopo-
litical essay purports to offer a ‘global view’ on the 
challenges facing humanity and the state from which 
the author writes. !e ‘global’ evoked is both geograph-
ical – the international system treated as a singular 
worldwide unit – and conceptual – it is comprehensive 
and totalizing. Implicitly if not explicitly, global vision is 
held to be superior to all situated and embedded forms 
of seeing. It sees how everything fits together. !ird, 
empowered by its multiply superior forms of seeing, the 
geopolitical essay engages in divination, prophecy and 
warning. It identifies and describes key spaces and signs 
from across the world, organizes these together using 
its preferred dualisms into an overarching narrative and 
issues imperatives based on the arrangement of these 
signs and their current qualities. !e geopolitical essay, 
in sum, is a genre of serious writing reliant on some key 
fictional conceits.
!is prologue helps situate Robert Kaplan’s essay 
in the ‘!ink Big’ issue of Foreign Policy magazine. 
Kaplan’s piece is a commodity, a paid piece of writing 
by a well know travel writer designed to stimulate, 
provoke and entertain the magazine’s readers. To this 
end, Kaplan needs to keep things relatively simple and 
engaging. His essay is a hybrid of the high-brow and 
middle-brow style of the geopolitical essay (while trading 
occasionally in some pulp fiction). It mixes elements 
of in-the-know fashion commentary  – ‘realism’ is ‘in’ 
this season; Mahan is “all the rage among Chinese and 
Indian strategists” – with classic elements of the geopo-
litical essay, promising insight into what endures and 
underlies the froth of events. !e hook of the essay is 
the promise of rediscovering, Indiana Jones style, lost 
Victorian era insight. Geography, Kaplan proclaims, is 
the force behind many of the events and conflicts facing 
the world. !is contention gets a B movie title: ‘!e 
Revenge of Geography.’
In developing this argument, the well-travelled 
Kaplan doesn’t rest his expertise solely on his experi-
ences traversing remote mountains and deserts (though 
‘I’ve been there’ is central to his writing). Following the 
formula of his travel writing, Kaplan consults classic 
writing and finds ‘guides’ full of wisdom and foresight 
supposedly forgotten by our age. Rebecca West was his 
guide to the awakening Balkans in the early 1990s and 
now in 2009 he’s rediscovered another forgotten British 
master guide, the conservative imperialist geographer 
Halford Mackinder. Just as his attachment to West lead 
him to a pit of primordialist clichés about the Balkans, 
Kaplan’s uncritical embrace of Mackinder leads him to 
global visions suffused with imperial anxiety.
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While the contemporary publication industry is 
in crisis, certain genres of writing from the previous 
century endure. One is the geopolitical essay, a form 
of discourse that came into its own in the twentieth 
century as journals and magazines on foreign policy were 
launched and sought an audience amongst an educated 
and internationally minded public. High-brow forms 
of the geopolitical essay appeared in specialist journals 
tied to influential associations and think tanks like the 
Royal Geographical Society (!e Geographical Journal) 
and the Council on Foreign Relations (Foreign Affairs). 
Middle-brow forms appeared in weekly news magazines 
like Time (founded in 1923) and Newsweek (launched in 
1933) as well as in magazines like !e Saturday Evening 
Post and Readers Digest magazine. Foreign Policy maga-
zine began life as an academic journal in 1970 but 
re-invented itself in the 1990s into a glossy bimonthly 
magazine available in airports and newsstands for 
cosmopolitans on the move.
!e geopolitical essay genre has three distinctive 
features. First, it purports to present a ‘strategic view’ 
of international affairs. !e prevailing conceit here is 
that the author is presenting a detached, objective, and 
long-term perspective on the course of human affairs. 
